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We propose that risk perceptions are systematically influenced by anthropomor-
phism. Anthropomorphism effects, however, are moderated by the individual’s feel-
ings of social power. People with low power perceive higher risk in playing a slot
machine (study 1) and in getting skin cancer (study 2) when the risk-bearing entities
(the slot machine and skin cancer) are highly anthropomorphized. In contrast, those
with high power perceive greater risk when the entities are less anthropomorphized.
We hypothesize these effects occur because those with high (low) power perceived
a greater (lesser) degree of control over the anthropomorphized entity. In study 3,
we investigate the reverse effect that higher perceived risk may increase anthro-
pomorphism for people with low power but decrease anthropomorphism for people
with high power.
Arecent IKEA advertisement made sport of people’sinclination to anthropomorphize products. In the ad-
vertisement, a woman discards a red lamp in her trash. The
lamp’s shade is pointed toward the house and the “neck”
and “head” of the lamp are angled enough to convey a
human quality about the product. As night falls and the rain
begins, the audience finds itself sympathizing with the dis-
carded lamp and disliking the woman as she reads com-
fortably in her house under her spiffy new IKEA lamp. At
just this moment, a man calls the audience out. “Many of
you feel bad for this lamp,” he says. “That is because you
are crazy. It has no feelings. And the new one is much
better.” The surprise is terrific, but the wonder of the ad is
its demonstration of just how readily people anthropomor-
phize. The ad works because the audience sees the old lamp
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as a servant harshly dumped by a master. The lamp does
not even have a humanlike face. The positioning of the
shade, tipped toward the house, is enough to convey longing
and loss. That is how fragile people’s perceptions may be
and how malleable their evaluations, depending on what
they see. Hence, understanding anthropomorphism is critical
to harnessing this important and pervasive tendency.
Anthropomorphism effects have recently captured social
psychologists’ attention, leading to investigations of why and
when people anthropomorphize nonhuman entities (Epley,
Akalis, et al. 2008; Epley, Waytz, et al. 2008; Epley, Waytz,
and Cacioppo 2007). Consumer behavior researchers, how-
ever, have focused on consequences of anthropomorphism,
especially on how anthropomorphizing affects liking of
products (Aggarwal and McGill 2007). In this research, we
extend the study of anthropomorphism by considering how
it might affect other judgments beyond liking, specifically,
how anthropomorphism affects risk perceptions and behav-
ior. In our studies, we examine people’s assessments of the
risks associated with a gambling machine and a disease and
how these risk perceptions might vary, depending on
whether these risk-bearing entities are anthropomorphized.
We further propose and find support for the hypothesis that
the consumers’ feelings of power moderate the effect of
anthropomorphism.
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Anthropomorphism
Anthropomorphism refers to the tendency to attribute hu-
manlike characteristics, intentions, and behavior to nonhu-
man objects (Aggarwal and McGill 2007; Epley et al. 2007;
Epley, Akalis, et al. 2008; Epley, Waytz, et al. 2008; Leyens
et al. 2003). Early research on anthropomorphism focused
on capacities of nonhuman objects by analyzing the extent
to which anthropomorphism represents accurate insight ver-
sus fanciful illusion (Cheney and Seyfarth 1990; Hauser
2000; Morgan 1894). Recent research, however, has begun
to investigate when and why people are likely to anthro-
pomorphize (Epley et al. 2007; Epley, Akalis, et al. 2008;
Epley, Waytz, et al. 2008). These studies describe factors
that influence people’s tendency to anthropomorphize non-
human entities, such as objects or animals. A cognition-
based story suggests that an increase in accessibility to the
human schema results in anthropomorphism (Aggarwal and
McGill 2007; Epley et al. 2007). For example, perceived
similarity between human behavior and the nonhuman move-
ment of objects increases accessibility of human schema,
which in turn increases anthropomorphism (Guthrie 1993;
Morewedge, Preston, and Wegner 2007). A motivation-
based story, however, posits that desire to understand the
acts of nonhuman agents or the need for belongingness can
determine the tendency to anthropomorphize (Epley et al.
2007; Epley, Waytz, et al. 2008). Compared to adults, young
children lack understanding of nonhuman objects, so they
are more likely to attribute life and mental states to nearly
all objects in the environment (e.g., angry cloud or happy
sun; Piaget 1929). Apart from such effectance motivation
(need for understanding), need for belongingness also can
be satisfied by making connections with two of the most
commonly anthropomorphized nonhuman entities: pets and
religious agents (Allen, Blascovich, and Mendes 2002;
Epley, Akalis, et al. 2008; Siegel 1990).
A more recent stream of research has changed the focus
from when and why people anthropomorphize to how an-
thropomorphism affects judgments and behavior. Most stud-
ies to date, however, suggest that anthropomorphism has a
positive effect on judgments and behavior. According to
those studies, anthropomorphism can enable a sense of ef-
ficacy with nonhuman entities, or it can increase emotional
bonding with them, which can positively affect judgments
of nonhuman entities. For example, people were more likely
to cooperate and work with humanlike robots than with
machinery robots (Kiesler and Goetz 2002). Also, partici-
pants showed more favorable attitudes toward a comput-
erized desert survival task when more anthropomorphic
faces and voices appeared in the interface (Burgoon et al.
2000).
Consumer behavior researchers also have been interested
in how anthropomorphism affects consumers’ judgments
and behavior, although this stream of research has largely
concentrated on the effects of anthropomorphized brands.
For example, researchers have studied brand personality
(Aaker 1997) and consumer-brand relationships (Aggarwal
2004; Fournier 1998). Despite the prevalence of marketers’
efforts to design anthropomorphic products and characters
in advertisements to generate desired emotional reactions
from consumers and, in turn, increase sales (Phillips 1996;
Welsh 2006), research on the effects of anthropomorphizing
the product as in the IKEA ad above is relatively rare. An
exception is recent work by Aggarwal and McGill (2007),
which examines anthropomorphism of the product itself.
This research finds that people increase liking of the target
product when a congruency exists between a marketer-ac-
tivated human schema and characteristics of the product
because people are more likely to see the metaphor. That
is, people can see the product as the person the marketer
has suggested. However, when the congruity is too low,
consumers are less likely to anthropomorphize the product
and in turn more likely to like the product less. Even though
this research represents a rare examination of the effect of
anthropomorphizing the product itself, it is still much like
previous studies in its focus on when people are more likely
to anthropomorphize and how liking judgments vary de-
pending on the degree of anthropomorphism.
Our research, by contrast, shows important downstream
consequences of anthropomorphism that go beyond simple
liking of products with humanlike physical features. Further,
this work demonstrates responses to anthropomorphized en-
tities that suggest perceptions of these objects as actually
human (or humanlike) as distinct from perceptions of these
objects as ultimately inhuman but as being usefully de-
scribed in human terms. The definition of anthropomor-
phism—as attributing humanlike attributes to nonhuman
objects—allows for two distinct forms of anthropomorphism
(see Guthrie [1993] for another three-part typology of an-
thropomorphism). One form of anthropomorphism relies on
analogical reasoning and uses the human schema to struc-
ture, think about, and communicate characteristics of the
nonhuman entities. The literature on brand personality and
some work on the antecedents of anthropomorphism, es-
pecially that on effectance motivation, may be seen as this
form of anthropomorphism. In this case, anthropomorphism
is a process of inductive reasoning or a simple description
of an observable appearance or behavior of nonhuman en-
tities. For example, a brand that can be relied on to fulfill
advertising promises may be described as trustworthy, anal-
ogous to a valued friend, but without really be seen as
possessing the underlying values and strength of will of a
person. Hence, in Aggarwal and McGill’s work (2007),
increased liking of a product with humanlike physical fea-
tures may not have been observed because participants
brought the brand to life but rather, as the authors argued,
because participants were able to grasp the analogy to an
activated human schema. The possibility of this somewhat
limited form of anthropomorphism might explain why Yoon
et al. (2006) observed neural dissociates between brand and
person judgments.
However, anthropomorphism may go beyond recognition
of surface similarities between objects and people (Waytz,
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Cacioppo, and Epley 2010). Attributing humanlike mental
states is a second form of anthropomorphism, one that is a
step closer to seeing nonhuman objects as being “really”
human. This type of anthropomorphism can trigger social
beliefs and perceptions afforded other human beings. Waytz
et al. (2010) found that when people perceived a nonhuman
entity to have a mind, they were more likely to treat the
entity as a moral agent worthy of empathic care and concern.
In this vein, Chandler and Schwarz (2010) demonstrated
that people were less willing to replace a product when they
saw it as having a humanlike mind. Even though this emerg-
ing stream of research recognizes important downstream
consequences of anthropomorphism beyond the product-
person metaphor, it still focuses on difference in judgments,
depending on the degree of anthropomorphism.
Our research, by contrast, explores situations in which
the same degree of anthropomorphism can color judgments
differently, depending on the social beliefs and expectations
of the consumer. We suggest that when consumers attribute
humanlike mental capacities to nonhuman objects, they will
apply beliefs and knowledge about their social world to the
object world, and consumers with different social concepts
will perceive the same anthropomorphized object differ-
ently. Hence, we measure application of social beliefs and
judgments toward nonhuman entities as a consequence of
anthropomorphism as evidence of whether consumers per-
ceive an anthropomorphized product to possess a humanlike
mind. Also, in contrast with previous work, we will inves-
tigate the effect of anthropomorphism on other types of
judgments beyond liking. We are particularly interested in
how anthropomorphism influences risk perceptions.
The central hypothesis of this research is that anthropo-
morphizing a product causes consumers to apply social ex-
pectations and beliefs they would not normally apply to an
inanimate entity. For example, for consumers considering
playing a slot machine, our hypothesis is that their percep-
tion of risk (and so their willingness to play) would depend
on whether they see the machine as being human. If the
product is not anthropomorphized, risk assessments should
follow from expectations about the machine’s settings and
calibration, that is, from nonsocial considerations. However,
if the entity is anthropomorphized, risk assessments should
follow from beliefs and expectations about human inter-
action, such as consumers’ perceived social power over oth-
ers, their degree of trust in others, their sense of personal
need, and their view of others as kind or altruistic. Hence,
anthropomorphism may have different effects, depending
on the model of social interaction brought to mind at the
time of the decision. In our research we focus specifically
on perceived social power.
Power, Control, and Risk Judgment
Power is a fundamental sociological concept and a central
motivating force in social interactions (Fiske and De´pret
1996; Keltner, Gruenfeld, and Anderson 2003). Hence,
power is an appropriate test of our theorizing regarding the
potential influence of social factors on the assessment of
anthropomorphized entities. Our study of power also co-
incides with current interest in the psychology literature on
the consequences of power (Fast et al. 2009; Galinsky,
Gruenfeld, and Magee 2003; Keltner et al. 2003), and it
complements this work by considering the influence of
power on nonhuman entities. In addition, understanding the
influence of power may have important practical implica-
tions for marketers because power perceptions are contex-
tually malleable. Therefore, if the influence of social power
can be properly understood, marketers might be able to sway
customers’ power perceptions in accordance with their strat-
egies. For example, briefly recalling past experience in
which one felt powerful or powerless (Galinsky et al. 2003)
or a short role play (Brinol et al. 2007) may be enough to
change one’s current perception of social power, which in
turn influences cognition, emotion, and behavior.
Most social psychology studies define power as an in-
dividual’s relative ability to control the states of others in
accordance with his or her own will (Fiske 1993; Thibaut
and Kelley 1959). Further, the causal relationship between
perceived power and feelings of control is bidirectional.
People believe they have more power over others when they
have more control (Copeland 1994; De´pret and Fiske 1993;
Thibaut and Kelley 1959), and people believe they have
more control when they feel more powerful (Bargh et al.
1995; Croizet and Claire 1998; Fast et al. 2009; Galinsky
et al. 2003). This research particularly focuses on the latter
link, that is, how feelings of power lead to perceived control.
In particular, we explore how feelings of power arising
from sources unrelated to a target entity, for example, re-
calling past experiences, may nevertheless affect perceived
control over that entity, especially when it is anthropomor-
phized. As such, we can view the effect of anthropomor-
phism on risk assessment as an “illusion of control” (Langer
1975). Previous research on illusory control shows that
when a task has some characteristics that people associate
with personal skill, individuals sometimes behave as if they
can influence outcomes that are actually the result of pure
chance (Langer 1975; Strickland, Lewicki, and Katz 1966;
Thompson, Armstrong, and Thomas 1998; Wohl and Enzle
2002). For example, people believe they are more likely to
attain a positive outcome when they roll a die themselves
than when an experimenter does or when they put in their
winning number than when a random number generator
gives them the number (Langer 1975). This research pro-
poses that anthropomorphism can also increase or decrease
illusory control through the (mis-) application of social
power onto nonhuman objects.
In sum, we propose that people will apply feelings of
social power when thinking about a risk-bearing mechanism
(e.g., a slot machine or a disease) that is anthropomorphized
but not when the mechanism appears to lack human traits.
Even when perceived power derives from sources unrelated
to the risk-generating entity, people might apply this feeling
when they see the entity as human and therefore subject to
the same social processes. Specifically, we argue that people
who feel powerful transfer this feeling of mastery to the
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anthropomorphized entity, believe they can control it, and
so feel less risk. In contrast, people who are low in power
feel at the mercy of the entity, feel lower control over the
entity, and so feel greater risk.
We examine this effect of perceived power on risk per-
ceptions for risk-bearing entities in studies 1 and 2. The first
study concerns a slot machine, and the second study, a con-
ceptual replication to a less pleasurable domain, concerns a
disease. Study 2 also provides evidence about the underlying
process by showing that perceived control over the non-
human entity mediates the interactive role of power and
anthropomorphism. In our third study, we investigate the
reverse effect in which risk perception influences the an-
thropomorphism tendency. The idea behind this third study
is that if people experience outcomes that seem to follow a
pattern they associate with their human interactions, they
will see a human entity as being behind those outcomes.
Specifically, we examine whether people with high power
increase anthropomorphism when they perceive low risk (vs.
high risk)—seeing the risk-bearing entity as more humanlike
—and whether those with low power increase anthropo-
morphism tendency when they perceive high risk (vs. low
risk).
EXPERIMENT 1
Experiment 1 tested whether anthropomorphism increased
(decreased) risk perception of playing the slot machine for
respondents with low (high) power perception. The exper-
iment employed a 2 (power: high vs. low) # 2 (humani-
zation: high vs. low) between-subjects design.
Method
Sixty-one undergraduate and graduate students (31 women)
from a private midwestern university in the United States
participated in this experiment for monetary compensation.
The study consisted of two phases: the power manipulation
phase and the risk perception measurement phase. First,
participants engaged in the power manipulation task and
then were guided to a computer room for a presumably
unrelated study. A full-size picture of a slot machine was
loaded onto the computer screen in advance, but the screen
was turned off. Participants were asked to turn on the com-
puter screen in front of them and to look at the picture for
a while. Then they read information about a slot machine
game. Finally, we asked them to answer questions involving
risk perception and behavioral intention to play the slot.
Power Manipulation. We manipulated power by ask-
ing participants to describe their own experience in which
they felt powerful (vs. powerless)—a method established in
social psychology (Galinsky et al. 2003). More specifically,
participants in the high-power condition read the following
statement: “When did you feel powerful? Please, recall your
past experience in which you had power over another person
or several people. You can feel powerful when you think
that you are influential on other’s beliefs and behaviors. You
also can feel powerful when you are in charge of something
for others. Please describe your own experience in which
you had power. What happened? How did you feel? Please
try to recall the experience as if you were experiencing it
now.” Participants in the low-power condition read the fol-
lowing statement: “When did you feel powerless? Please,
recall your past experience in which someone else had power
over you. You can feel powerless when you think that some-
one else is influential on your beliefs and behaviors. You
also can feel powerless when someone else is in charge of
something for a group you belong. Please describe your own
experience in which you felt powerless. What happened?
How did you feel? Please try to recall the experience as if
you were experiencing it now.”
Anthropomorphism Manipulation. Participants in the
risk measurement phase learned that the purpose of the study
was to understand people’s attitudes and experiences in a
casino. They were asked to imagine that they were in a
casino for gambling and had found an available slot machine
to play (the one on the computer monitor). Participants in
the high-anthropomorphism condition saw a slot machine
picture that looked more like a human than did those in the
low-anthropomorphism condition. We manipulated the de-
gree of anthropomorphism by changing only the arrange-
ment of rectangular bars on the upper part of the machine
(see fig. 1; the left picture is the more highly anthropo-
morphized slot machine). In the high-anthropomorphism
condition, we arranged three small rectangles to form two
eyes and a mouth. In the low-anthropomorphism condition,
we connected the three rectangles and placed them on top
of the machine. We kept the rest of the body the same for
both conditions. Participants also received information about
the slot machine game (how to play, the winning combi-
nations), which was the same for both the high- and the
low-anthropomorphism conditions.
Dependent Variables. First, to measure risk percep-
tion, each participant indicated how risky the slot game
seemed to be (1 p not at all risky; 7 p very risky), how
likely they were to win at all (1p very unlikely; 7p very
likely), and if they did win, how big they thought the prize
would be (1 p very small; 7 p very big). Then they also
indicated to what extent they were willing to play the game
(1 p not at all; 7 p very much). For the manipulation
check of anthropomorphism, participants were asked to what
extent they thought the slot they saw on the screen looked
like a human (“It looks like a person,” “It seems almost as
if it has free will,” and “It seems almost as if it has inten-
tions”; 1 p disagree; 7 p agree).
Additional Control Measures. In addition to the pri-
mary measures of interest, we also asked all participants to
indicate general risk-taking tendency (“I generally like to
take a risk”; 1 p disagree; 7 p agree), general liking of
playing slots (“I generally like to play slots”; 1p disagree;
7 p agree), attention to information about the game (1 p
paid little attention; 7 p paid a lot of attention to the in-
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FIGURE 1
SLOT MACHINE ANTHROPOMORPHISM (EXPERIMENT 1)
NOTE.—Left, more highly anthropomorphized slot machine. Color version available as an online enhancement.
FIGURE 2
THE EFFECT OF POWER AND ANTHROPOMORPHISM ON
WILLINGNESS TO PLAY THE SLOT GAME (EXPERIMENT 1)
formation), attention to picture (1 p paid little attention; 7
p paid a lot of attention to the picture), current mood (1p
feel bad; 7 p feel good), and their current level of arousal
(1p feel depressed; 7p feel excited) as control variables,
in order to ensure that these factors did not cause the results.
Results
Manipulation Check and Control Measures. We av-
eraged three items to measure the degree of anthropomor-
phism (looks like a person, has free will, has intentions; a
p 0.83). We conducted a 2 (power: high vs. low)# 2 (an-
thropomorphism: high vs. low) between-subjects ANOVA on
perception of the slot. As we intended, participants in the
high-anthropomorphism conditions indicated that the slot
machine looked more like a human than did those in low-
anthropomorphism conditions (Mhi p 2.88, Mlow p 1.67;
F(1, 57)p 12.70, p ! .01). No other effects were significant
(p’s 1 .20). We also conducted a 2 (power: high vs. low)
# 2 (anthropomorphism: high vs. low) between-subjects
ANOVA on each of the control measures. The analyses
showed that power perception or anthropomorphism did not
affect participants’ general risk-taking tendency, general lik-
ing of playing slots, attention to information about the game,
attention to picture, mood, and arousal (all p’s 1 .19).
Hypothesis Testing. We conducted a 2 (power: high
vs. low) # 2 (anthropomorphism: high vs. low) ANOVA
in which willingness to play the game served as a dependent
variable. The result revealed a significant interaction effect
(F(1, 57) p 19.63, p ! .01) but no other significant effects
(p’s 1 .20; see fig. 2). Specific contrasts revealed that par-
ticipants in the high-power conditions were more willing to
play the game when the slot machine looked more like a
human (Mhi an p 4.13, Mlow an p 2.27; F(1, 57) p 16.36, p
! .01). However, participants in the low-power conditions
indicated that they were less likely to play the game when
the slot looked more like a human (Mhi anp 2.71, Mlow anp
3.71; F(1, 57) p 4.89, p ! .05). Looking at the other pair
of contrasts, we found, consistent with our theorizing, that
high-power participants were more likely than low-power
participants to play the game when the machine looked like
a person (Mhi powp 4.13, Mlow powp 2.71; F(1, 57)p 10.18,
p ! .01). We also found a significant difference between
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FIGURE 3
THE EFFECT OF POWER AND ANTHROPOMORPHISM ON
RISK PERCEPTION OF THE SLOT GAME (EXPERIMENT 1)
high- and low-power participants in the low-anthropomor-
phism condition (Mhi pow p 2.27, Mlow pow p 3.71; F(1, 57)
p 9.49, p ! .01). That is, those in high power were less
likely to play the game with the low-anthropomorphized
machine compared to those in low power. Although we did
not predict this effect, it may be explained within our same
broad framework by suggesting that people who are low in
social power feel most at ease, that is, are in their comfort
zone in the world of objects, whereas those with high social
power feel out of their depth. Hence, the low-social-power
people feel they can master the objectified slot machine,
while the high-social-power people feel they cannot.
Risk Perception. In order to compute the risk-percep-
tion component, we averaged three items to measure risk
perception (riskiness, likelihood to win, and expected prize
value; a p 0.67). The scales for likelihood to win and
expected prize value were reversed. That is, greater scores
on these items indicated greater risk perception. According
to a power-by-humanization two-way ANOVA, participants
with low power perceived greater risk than those with high
power, even though the difference was only marginally sig-
nificant (Mhi pow p 4.77, Mlow pow p 5.11; F(1, 57) p 2.74,
p p .10). This main effect of power is consistent with
previous literature demonstrating that power increases con-
trollability over the situation (Bargh et al. 1995; Fast et al.
2009; Galinsky et al. 2003). However, such application of
power was qualified by the significant interaction (F(1, 57)
p 7.36, p ! .01; see fig. 3). As expected, participants with
high power perceived the game as less risky when the slot
looked more like a human (Mhi an p 4.53, Mlow an p 5.02;
F(1, 57) p 2.93, p ! .10). However, participants with low
power perceived the game as riskier when they saw human
features in the picture (Mhi an p 5.41, Mlow an p 4.81; F(1,
57) p 4.54, p ! .05). For the other pair of contrasts, con-
sistent with our theory, the powerful perceived lower risk
than the powerless in the high-anthropomorphism condition
(Mhi pow p 4.53, Mlow pow p 5.41; F(1, 57) p 10.05, p !
.01). However, different from willingness to play the game,
in the case of risk perception, difference between the pow-
erful and the powerless was not significant in the low-an-
thropomorphism condition (Mhi powp 5.02, Mlow powp 4.81;
F(1, 57) p 0.53, NS).
Mediation Analyses. In order to test whether risk per-
ception mediates the interactive effect of power and an-
thropomorphism on willingness to play, we conducted a
mediated moderation analysis based on Muller, Judd, and
Yzerbyt (2005). If risk perception indeed mediates the in-
teractive effect of power and anthropomorphism on will-
ingness to play, we should observe (1) a significant inter-
action effect of power and anthropomorphism on willingness
to play and (2) a significant interaction effect of power and
anthropomorphism on risk perception. Further, (3) when we
include both risk perception and the interaction term (power
# anthropomorphism), risk perception should remain sig-
nificant, but the interaction term should reduce in signifi-
cance. As we predicted, the analysis revealed a significant
effect of the interaction between power and anthropomor-
phism on willingness to play (b p 0.72, SE p 0.16, t(57)
p 4.43, p ! .01), a significant negative effect of risk per-
ception on willingness to play (b p 0.67, SE p 0.21,
t(59) p 3.23, p ! .01), and a significant effect of inter-
action between power and anthropomorphism on risk per-
ception (bp 0.28, SEp 0.10, t(57)p 2.72, p ! .01).
In a regression, which included power, anthropomorphism,
power # anthropomorphism, risk perception, and risk per-
ception # power as predictors of willingness to play (eq.
6 from Muller et al. 2005), the effect of risk perception was
still significant (b p 0.43, SE p 0.21, t(55) p 2.06,
p ! .05), but the interactive effect of power and anthropo-
morphism reduced in significance (b p 0.61, SE p 0.17,
t(55) p 3.62, p ! .01; Sobel’s z p 1.66, p ! .10). Thus,
risk perception mediated the effect of interaction between
power and anthropomorphism on willingness to play the
slot.
Discussion
Experiment 1 presents several noteworthy findings. First,
replicating previous research (Burgoon et al. 2000; Kiesler
and Goetz 2002), it shows that anthropomorphism increased
liking of interacting (gaming in this case) with the anthro-
pomorphized entity (the slot machine). Second, extending
previous research, our study shows that (a) this positive
anthropomorphism effect occurred only for participants with
high rather than low power, and (b) risk perception, which
represents perceived control over the machine, mediated the
anthropomorphism effects. Different from risk-free nonhu-
man objects in the previous studies (Burgoon et al. 2000;
Kiesler and Goetz 2002; Turkle 2000), a slot machine game
bears risk, and our findings indicate that when risk percep-
tion determines intention to interact with risk-generating en-
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tities, anthropomorphism effects are not always positive.
Instead, the effect of anthropomorphism varies, depending
on an individual’s power perception at that moment.
Moreover, note that subtle changes in the appearance of
the slot machine were enough to alter individuals’ risk per-
ception. In this study, the only change in the machine was
the appearance of a decorative red strip at the top of the
machine (one long bar or three shorter red bars positioned
as if they were two eyes and a mouth). A manipulation
check confirmed that this small change in appearance was
sufficient to produce a difference in the degree to which
participants anthropomorphized the slot machine. Finally,
across the conditions, we did not observe any differences
in general risk-taking tendency, general liking of playing
slots, attention, mood, and arousal, suggesting that differ-
ences in processing styles are unlikely to account for our
effects.
EXPERIMENT 2
One purpose of experiment 2 was to replicate the anthro-
pomorphism effects we observed in experiment 1. This rep-
lication is important because the interaction of anthropo-
morphism and power on risk perception achieved only
marginal significance in the prior study. Experiment 2 also
extends our findings to a new domain. Unlike a slot machine,
which is a relatively pleasurable risk-bearing entity (games
are for fun after all), the risk-bearing entity in our second
study is not pleasurable, specifically, skin cancer. Finally,
this study further tests our theory by providing process evi-
dence that people apply their perception of social power to
highly anthropomorphized objects by changing perceived
control over them. We expected that high social power
would increase perceived control over a highly humanized
skin cancer, which in turn would decrease perceived risk,
whereas low power would decrease perceived control, which
in turn would increase risk perception toward the highly
humanized skin cancer.
Method
Power Manipulation. Eighty-four undergraduate and
graduate students (41 women) from the same university as
in experiment 1 participated in this experiment for monetary
compensation. We manipulated power perception as in ex-
periment 1. Participants wrote about an experience in which
they felt powerful (vs. powerless).
Anthropomorphism Manipulation. Participants were
then asked to wait while the experimenter prepared the next
study. While they waited, we asked them whether they
wanted to read and provide some feedback on a health-
related message that had recently been released. All the
participants agreed to do so. The message was a description
of a type of skin cancer. Participants in the high-anthro-
pomorphism condition read the following message in which
skin cancer is described as if it has humanlike intentions to
hurt people:
Skin cancers are the most common members of the cancer
family—almost like a crime family. It is estimated that over
1 million new people are attacked by these criminals. The
annual rates of all new members of them are increasing each
year, representing a growing public concern. The most com-
mon warning sign of their activity is a change in the ap-
pearance of the skin, such as a new growth or a sore that
will not heal. There are some different types of family mem-
bers, but the most common and potentially dangerous mem-
ber is:
B cell carcinoma:
This member is the most common among the cancer family
(90% of all skin cancer in the U.S). According to the U.S.
National Institutes of Health, exposure to ultraviolet (UV)
radiation from the sun is the main cause. The growth of this
member is not only because of accumulated sun exposure
but also because of intermittent sun exposure like that re-
ceived during vacation, especially early in life (between 15
to 25). This cancer begins to grow as a small, dome-shaped
bump and often lives surrounded by small, superficial blood
vessels. This member grows slowly, taking months or even
years to become noticeable. Sometimes, this cancer can dam-
age and disfigure the eye, ear, or nose if it grows nearby.
Snow on the ground doesn’t mean you don’t have to worry
about sun exposure. Skin cancers can come to you even in
winter months. When they come, they don’t care that you
are just starting out in life and family members range from
the petty thief to outright killers. Protection from the sun is
the best way to prevent this disease.
Participants in the low-anthropomorphism condition read the
following message:
Skin cancers are the most common form of cancers. It is
estimated that over 1 million new cases occur annually. The
annual rates of all forms of skin cancer are increasing each
year, representing a growing public concern. The most com-
mon warning sign of skin cancer activity is a change in the
appearance of the skin, such as a new growth or a sore that
will not heal. There are some different forms of skin cancer,
but the most common and potentially serious form is:
B cell carcinoma:
It is the most common form of skin cancer category (90%
of all skin cancer in the U.S). According to the U.S. National
Institutes of Health, exposure to ultraviolet (UV) radiation
from the sun is the main cause. The development of this
cancer is not only because of accumulated sun exposure but
also because of intermittent sun exposure like that received
during vacation, especially early in life (between 15 to 25).
This cancer begins to develop as a small, dome-shaped bump
and is often covered by small, superficial blood vessels. It
develops slowly, taking months or even years to become
sizable. Sometimes, this cancer can damage and disfigure the
eye, ear, or nose if it occurs nearby.
Snow on the ground doesn’t mean you don’t have to worry
about sun exposure. Skin cancers can happen to you even in
winter months. These diseases can strike people just starting
out in life and their effects can range from taking a small
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measure of health to fatality. Protection from the sun is the
best way to prevent this disease.
Dependent Variables. After reading the message, par-
ticipants rated their perceived risk associated with skin can-
cer (serious, life threatening, and risky; 1p not at all; 9p
very). Then, they indicated their perceived control over skin
cancer. The four measurement items of control perception
consisted of two subcategories: perceived control before get-
ting the disease (“I believe I can effectively resist this dis-
ease” and “This disease has little chance of taking hold in
me”; 1 p disagree; 7 p agree) and perceived control after
getting the disease (“If I get this disease, I believe I could
fight it off quickly” and “If I get this disease, it will not get
the better of me”; 1 p disagree; 7 p agree). Participants
also indicated the extent to which they felt skin cancer
seemed to be like a human (“It sounds almost as if it has
intentions” and “It sounds almost as if it has free will”; 1
p disagree; 7p agree). We used different items to measure
the degree of anthropomorphism because unlike in experi-
ment 1, anthropomorphism in this experiment was not about
appearance; rather, it was about humanlike intentions.
Additional Control Measures. Finally, we measured
control variables. All participants indicated their interest in
skin care (“In general, I care about my skin” and “In general,
I’m interested in skin care products”; 1 p disagree; 7 p
agree), subjective knowledge about skin cancers (“I think
I’m knowledgeable about skin cancers” and “I already knew
a lot of information about skin cancers”; 1 p disagree; 7
p agree), attention to the ads (1 p paid little attention; 7
p paid a lot of attention to the information), mood (1 p
feel bad; 7 p feel good), and arousal (1p feel depressed;
7 p feel excited).
Results
Manipulation Check and Control Measures. We av-
eraged two items to measure anthropomorphism: humanlike
intentions and free will (a p .83). Then, we conducted a
2 (power: high vs. low) # 2 (anthropomorphism: high vs.
low) between-subjects ANOVA with anthropomorphism
perception as a dependent variable. The analysis revealed
that participants in high-anthropomorphism conditions in-
dicated that skin cancer sounded more like a disease with
humanlike intentions and free will than did those in low-
anthropomorphism conditions (Mhi anp 4.95, Mlowanp 3.80;
F(1, 80)p 9.88, p ! .01). No other effects were significant
(p’s 1 .20), indicating successful manipulation. In addition,
2 (power: high vs. low) # 2 (anthropomorphism: high vs.
low) ANOVAs revealed that interest in skin care, subjective
knowledge in skin cancers, attention to the ads, mood, and
arousal did not explain the effects (all p’s 1 .20).
Risk Perception. We predicted that participants with
low power would think of skin cancer as a more serious,
dangerous disease if it was highly humanized, whereas those
with high power would show the opposite pattern. In order
to test this prediction, a 2 (power: high vs. low) # 2 (an-
thropomorphism: high vs. low) ANOVA was conducted.
Consistent with prior research on power, participants with
low power (vs. high power) thought skin cancer was a risk-
ier, more serious disease, although the effect was not sig-
nificant (Mhi pow p 6.54, Mlow pow p 7.02; F(1, 80) p 1.93,
pp .16). However, more important and consistent with our
prediction, the interaction between power and anthropo-
morphism was significant (F(1, 80) p 6.49, p p .01; see
fig. 4). As predicted, participants with high power thought
skin cancer was a riskier, more serious disease when it was
less humanized (Mhi anp 6.08, Mlow an p 7.00; F(1, 80) p
3.06, p p .08), whereas those with low power evaluated
skin cancer as a riskier disease when it was highly human-
ized (Mhi an p 7.45, Mlow an p 6.59; F(1, 80) p 3.54, p p
.06). Consistent with our theorizing, we also found high-
power participants thought that the disease was less risky
than did low-power participants when it was highly anthro-
pomorphized (Mhi pow p 6.08, Mlow pow p 7.45; F(1, 80) p
7.63, p ! .01). However, toward the less anthropomorphized
skin cancer, risk perception was not significantly different
between the powerful and the powerless, which is consistent
with experiment 1 (Mhi pow p 7.00, Mlow pow p 6.59; F(1,
80) p 0.68, p 1 .40).
Control Perception. Our theory posits that people ap-
ply their social beliefs toward anthropomorphized entities;
thus, those with high power feel greater control over highly
anthropomorphized entities just as they would feel in a social
context, whereas those with low power feel less control over
highly anthropomorphized entities. To test this prediction,
a 2 (power: high vs. low) # 2 (anthropomorphism: high
vs. low) ANOVA was conducted with control perception
(ap .71) serving as a dependent variable. In this analysis,
only the interaction between power and anthropomorphism
was significant (F(1, 80)p 9.56, p ! .01; see fig. 5). Planned
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contrast analysis revealed, as predicted, that participants with
high power indicated greater control perception over the
highly anthropomorphized disease (Mhi an p 4.56, Mlow an p
3.71; F(1, 80) p 5.59, p ! .05). However, those with low
power felt lower control over skin cancer when it was highly
humanized (Mhi anp 3.75, Mlow anp 4.37; F(1, 80)p 3.98,
p ! .05). For the other contrasts, consistent with our theory
that people will apply their social beliefs into highly an-
thropomorphized entities, participants with high (vs. low)
power felt that they had greater control over skin cancer
when it was highly anthropomorphized (Mhi pow p 4.56,
Mlow pow p 3.75; F(1, 80) p 5.73, p p .01). In addition,
we also observed a significant difference between high and
low power in the low-anthropomorphism condition (Mhi pow
p 3.71, Mlow pow p 4.37; F(1, 80) p 3.91, p p .05). As
we speculated in the first experiment, it is possible that this
finding reflects greater comfort felt by low-power people in
the world of objects.
Mediation Analyses. In order to see whether control
perception mediates the interaction effect between power
and anthropomorphism on risk perception, we again con-
ducted a mediated moderation analysis as in experiment 1
(Muller et al. 2005). The mediated moderation analysis
showed a significant effect of the interaction between power
and anthropomorphism on risk perception (bp 0.45, SE
p 0.18, t(80) p 2.55, p p .01), a significant negative
effect of control perception on risk perception (bp 0.55,
SEp 0.15, t(82)p3.68, p ! .01), and a significant effect
of interaction between power and anthropomorphism on
control perception (b p 0.37, SE p 0.12, t(80) p 3.09, p
! .01). When control perception was included as a covariate
examining the interactive effect between power and anthro-
pomorphism on risk perception, the effect of control per-
ception was still significant (b p 0.40, SE p 0.17, t(78)
p 2.39, p ! .05), but the interaction reduced in signifi-
cance (b p 0.31, SE p 0.18, t(78) p 1.71, p p .09;
Sobel’s z p 1.87, p p .06). Therefore, control perception
mediated the interaction effect between power and anthro-
pomorphism on risk perception.
Discussion
By replicating the findings of experiment 1 while using
a different manipulation of anthropomorphism and a dif-
ferent target, experiment 2 provides converging evidence
toward our conceptual framework. In experiment 1, whether
the nonhuman entity (the slot machine) had a humanlike
face determined the degree of anthropomorphism. By con-
trast, in experiment 2, participants perceived different de-
grees of anthropomorphism, depending on whether the risk-
bearing entity (skin cancer) was described as having a
humanlike intention to harm people. The data again dem-
onstrated that power perception moderated the effect of an-
thropomorphism on risk perception. Participants with low
power perceived greater risk from the highly anthropomor-
phized skin cancer, whereas those with high power perceived
lower risk from it. Furthermore, the interactive effect of
power and anthropomorphism on risk perception was me-
diated by perceived control. High power increased control
perception and so lowered perceived risk, whereas low
power decreased control perception and so increased per-
ceived risk, but only when skin cancer was described as if
it had humanlike intentions.
EXPERIMENT 3
Our first two experiments showed that participants with low
power felt greater risk when the risk-bearing entity was
highly anthropomorphized, whereas those with high power
felt lower risk toward the highly humanized entity. Our
explanation for this effect is simple: once an object is an-
thropomorphized, people think about it according to familiar
social roles, norms, and expectations. Hence, participants
with low power acted as if they believed they would be at
the mercy of anthropomorphized entities, whereas partici-
pants with high power appeared to think they could bend
these entities to their will. In study 3, we look further into
the application of social perceptions on objects. In this study,
we test the hypothesis that people’s power perceptions cou-
pled with their outcomes will influence their tendency to
anthropomorphize. The idea here is that people infer hu-
manity from the way these objects appear to be “acting”
toward them. If people feel high power and the object ap-
pears to be giving them what they want, they anthropo-
morphize the object because it is acting the way other people
would act toward a high-power person. By contrast, if people
feel low power and the object is giving them what they
want, they are less likely to anthropomorphize the object.
After all, if the object were a person, low-power people
would not expect to get their way. However, if things go
poorly for a low-power person, the individual may sense
the presence of another person. Hence, in experiment 3, we
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will show the reverse effect (in terms of direction of cau-
sation) of the first two studies, specifically that individuals
with low power will increase anthropomorphism when they
feel greater risk, whereas those with high power will increase
anthropomorphism when they feel less risk. Risk perception
will be manipulated with winning versus losing the slot
machine game. We predict that people with high power will
be more likely to anthropomorphize the slot after they win,
whereas people with low power will be more likely to an-
thropomorphize the slot after they lose.
Method
Seventy-nine students (33 women) from the same uni-
versity as the first two studies participated in this experiment
for monetary compensation. As in the previous two exper-
iments, participants first wrote about an experience in which
they felt either powerful or powerless, depending on the
condition. Then for a presumably unrelated study, experi-
menters asked participants to play a slot machine game 10
times. A screen depicted the slot machine they were to play
(see fig. 6). We intended the appearance of this machine to
be ambiguous, lacking the “facial” features of the anthro-
pomorphized machine in study 1, which had design elements
we arranged to look like eyes and a mouth (refer back to
fig. 1). However, this machine had more potential to be
anthropomorphized than the machine in the object condition
of that study because the bar at the top of the machine was
not solid. People could interpret the three components as
facial features.
Participants learned that each time they pressed a button
they would get a combination of three symbols. If the com-
bination of symbols included at least one of five winning
symbols, they would win, and if they won more than five
of 10 games, they would receive a prize at the end of ex-
periment. Experimenters also told them that they had about
a 50% chance of winning the prize. The participants then
played the game. The results were already programmed, so
half of the participants won the game seven times, which
means they won the prize, whereas the other half lost the
game seven times, which means they did not win the prize.
The prize was a chocolate bar, but participants did not know
what the prize was until they finished the game.
Dependent Variables. After playing the game, partic-
ipants received a questionnaire that asked them first to
choose which of two photos of slot machines they thought
was more similar to the one they had played (see fig. 7).
The photo of the machine at the lower end of the scale had
served as our object condition in study 1, whereas the photo
of the machine at the high end of the scale had served as
our anthropomorphism condition. Hence, this 9-point scale
served as our measure of anthropomorphism, with a greater
number indicating greater anthropomorphism.
Additional Control Measures. All participants indi-
cated their general risk-taking tendency (“I generally like
to take a risk”; 1 p disagree; 7 p agree), general liking
of playing slots (“I generally like to play slots”; 1 p dis-
agree; 7 p agree), attention to the game (1 p paid little
attention; 7p paid a lot of attention to the game), and mood
(1 p feel bad; 7 p feel good).
Results and Discussion
Manipulation Check and Control Measures. Sepa-
rate 2 (power: high vs. low)# 2 (game result: winning vs.
losing) ANOVAs revealed that general risk-taking tendency,
general liking of playing slots, and attention to the game
were not different across conditions (all F’s ! 1). A 2
(power: high vs. low)# 2 (game result: winning vs. losing)
ANOVA on mood revealed that participants felt better after
winning than losing (Mwin p 5.54, Mlose p 3.96; F(1, 73)
p 26.04, p ! .01); however, this finding did not explain the
interaction effect between power and game result.
Hypothesis Testing. We predicted that participants
with high power would be more likely to anthropomorphize
the slot machine after winning than losing, whereas those
with low power would show the opposite pattern. We con-
ducted a 2 (power: high vs. low)# 2 (game result: winning
vs. losing) ANOVA in order to test this prediction. The
interaction effect was significant (F(1, 73)p 6.44, pp .01;
see fig. 8). Other effects were not significant. As predicted,
planned contrasts revealed that participants with high power
thought the machine they played looked more like a human
after they won the game than after they lost (Mwin p 6.55,
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Mlose p 4.62; F(1, 73) p 6.95, p p .01). In contrast, par-
ticipants with low power indicated the slot machine they
played looked more like a human after they lost the game,
even though the effect did not reach a significant level (Mwin
p 5.21, Mlose p 6.00; F(1, 73) p 1.02, p p .31). Hence,
participants appear to have inferred the presence of a human
entity on the basis of the outcomes they received. In par-
ticular, participants appear to have anthropomorphized the
machine, depending on their expectations about how a per-
son would treat them on the basis of their level of power—-
giving them what they wanted or taking advantage of them.
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND
CONCLUSION
Marketers often believe consumers will feel more positively
toward their products if they see these products in human
terms. For instance, toy makers try to create social bonds
between children and their anthropomorphized toys (Turkle
2000). Car makers shape the headlights and grilles of cars
to suggest a human face in order to appeal to buyers (Welsh
2006). Prior research largely supports these beliefs about
the positive effects of anthropomorphism (for an exception,
see Aggarwal and McGill [2007], study 3). For example,
participants liked anthropomorphized robots more (Kiesler
and Goetz 2002), liked programs with an anthropomor-
phized interface more (Burgoon et al. 2000), and showed
greater improvement in their ability to learn software sup-
ported by anthropomorphic virtual assistants (Moreale and
Watt 2004). However, our findings indicate that when an-
thropomorphized entities bear risk, the effect of anthropo-
morphism may not be uniformly positive.
Specifically, our findings reveal that when entities bear
risk, the effect of anthropomorphism is moderated by feel-
ings of social power. Anthropomorphism increases risk per-
ceptions for those with low power, whereas it decreases risk
perception for those with high power. We trace these findings
to people’s application of social beliefs and expectations to
anthropomorphized risk-bearing entities. Hence, high social
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power makes people think they can control outcomes from
anthropomorphized, risk-bearing entities, which in turn de-
creases risk perception. By contrast, lack of social power
increases risk perception because people think they will not
be able to control the entity to get their way. In other words,
an anthropomorphized entity “behaves,” and this behavior
is subject to social rules, norms, and expectations. It can be
cajoled, bullied, and sweet talked. A nonanthropomorphized
entity “generates” outcomes and is not swayed by such an-
tics.
Our findings, therefore, contribute to an emerging body
of work that extends the understanding of anthropomor-
phism beyond an object-person metaphor triggered by hu-
manlike physical features (Aggarwal 2004; Aggarwal and
McGill 2007; Fournier 1998; Trampe, Stapel, and Siero
2007) to attribution of a humanlike mind to the anthropo-
morphized entity (Chandler and Schwarz 2010; Waytz et al.
2010). A consequence of this attribution is that the effect
of anthropomorphism will not be the same for everybody.
Rather, the effect of anthropomorphism will depend on what
kind of social beliefs and perceptions people apply to non-
human objects.
Hence, studies 1 and 2 show converging evidence that
anthropomorphism increases the application of power by
changing participants’ perceptions of control. In study 1,
humanizing a slot machine led participants with high power
to perceive the game as less risky compared to a nonan-
thropomorphized machine, whereas humanizing the ma-
chine caused those with low power to perceive the game as
riskier. This risk perception in turn negatively affected will-
ingness to play the game. Those with high power were more
willing to play the highly anthropomorphized machine,
whereas those with low power were more willing to play
the less (or non-) anthropomorphized machine. Study 2 rep-
licates this interactive effect between power and anthropo-
morphism. However, different from study 1, in which the
slot machine is anthropomorphized with a humanlike ap-
pearance, we manipulated the degree of anthropomorphism
in study 2 through the description of a skin cancer. We
described the highly anthropomorphized skin cancer as if it
were a criminal with an evil intention to harm people. Con-
sistent with study 1, people with high power thought the
highly anthropomorphized skin cancer was less risky than
skin cancer described in conventional terms. Participants
with low power showed the opposite pattern. In addition to
serving as a conceptual replication of study 1, study 2 pro-
vides evidence about the process by which power percep-
tions moderate the effect of anthropomorphism. In particular,
high power increases perceived control over anthropomor-
phized entities, while low power decreases perceived con-
trol, leading to the observed effects on risk perceptions.
An unexpected finding in our first two studies concerns
the difference in willingness to play the slot machine (study
1) and the perceived susceptibility to the disease (study 2)
between participants who were high and low in social power
in the low-anthropomorphism condition. We had initially
expected no effect of social power in the world of machines
and diseases that were not anthropomorphized. The central
tenet of our theory is that anthropomorphism activates social
concerns such as power in nonsocial domains. That thinking,
however, may have overlooked the possibility that people
find places to feel comfortable and in charge. High social
power plays out in the world of people or, as we have
demonstrated, the world of anthropomorphized entities.
However, low social power may lead people to feel better
in a world precisely devoid of humanization. As a conse-
quence, the low-social-power participants were more willing
to play the machine and saw less risk in the disease when
it was not humanized. The psychological mechanism by
which being in a “comfort zone” plays out in the world of
objects for low-power consumers is not clear. It might be a
simple process by which low-power people contrast the un-
comfortable, even bullying world of people with that of
objects and so feel less risk in the latter. Instead of the effect
being the result of a contrast effect, low-power people may
use objects to make up for feeling powerless, along the lines
of recent research by Rucker and Galinsky (2008), who
found that people who are low in social power show more
favorable attitudes toward products associated with status
to compensate for their lower power. Our thoughts here are
speculative, however, and future research is needed to ex-
plore the surprising influence of social power in nonsocial
domains.
Our third study looked further into the prediction that
anthropomorphized entities are understood through a rich
social lens. Whereas the first two studies explored how an-
thropomorphism affects risk perception, the last study
showed that risk perception can also affect the tendency to
anthropomorphize. In this study, participants appeared to
infer the presence of a human entity from their experiences
with the slot machine. If people felt high power and the slot
machine appeared to be giving them what they wanted (win-
ning results), they anthropomorphized the object. People
with low power, however, appeared more likely to anthro-
pomorphize the object when it did not treat them well (i.e.,
provided losing results), although this effect was not sig-
nificant.
This last study therefore extends the field’s understanding
of the sorts of factors that can affect anthropomorphism.
Prior work shows that characteristics of the object, for ex-
ample, appearance (e.g., Graham and Poulin-Dubois 1999;
Guthrie 1993) and movement (Morewedge et al. 2007; Tre-
moulet and Feldman 2000) influence the tendency to an-
thropomorphize. Other work has looked at factors associated
with the person, specifically, accessibility of the human
schema and needs that may be filled by seeing the human
in the nonhuman, such as the need for understanding or
companionship (Epley et al. 2007). Our work suggests an
interactive effect between object and person. The object is
more likely to be anthropomorphized if the person’s ex-
periences with it align with expectations and experiences
for how other people tend to interact with that person. Hence,
a high-power person might find the human in good out-
comes, as might a trusting person or someone who believes
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in the basic goodness of people. A low-power person, one
who lacks trust or who believes other people are inherently
unkind, may find the human in bad outcomes. To the extent
that belief in a deity reflects the tendency to anthropomor-
phize, this finding might explain why some people see god
in the joys of the world, whereas others find evidence of
god in tragedies.
This research contributes to the literature on illusory con-
trol as well as on power. Whereas prior work documents
the misuse of factors related to skill (e.g., rolling the die
themselves, selecting lottery numbers themselves) in as-
sessing risk, our work documents the misapplication of so-
cial factors. A subtle difference in the appearance of the slot
machine was enough to increase the perception of the slot
machine as human, which in turn affected risk perception.
Similarly, describing a disease as having intentions made
people see the disease in human terms, which in turn affected
their beliefs about their ability to resist the disease or, if
they did get it, to fight it off. Such a change in control
perception is illusory because the objective chance of win-
ning the game or catching the disease was the same, re-
gardless of whether the machine and disease were presented
as people. In addition, whereas most research on power has
been conducted in a social context, this research shows that
people may also apply their social power perceptions to
nonhuman entities, provided they think of these entities in
human terms.
This research further delivers important insights for gam-
bling and health messages. When gambling, people are not
uniformly more willing to interact with more humanlike
machines, as a simplistic, positive view of the effect of an-
thropomorphism might suggest. Their power perception at
that time also determines their intention to play the game.
Considering that power perception is not chronically stable
but is instead contextually flexible, marketers might be able
to set strategies to increase or decrease people’s willingness
to play the game by changing their power perceptions or
the appearance of machines. For example, a change in the
height of the chair in front of the slot machine might change
power perception. Our study revealed that a subtle change
in the appearance of the slot machine can change anthro-
pomorphism tendencies. Similar effects might occur for the
perception of disease prevention messages. This research
suggests that anthropomorphizing the disease can either in-
crease or decrease risk perception, depending on perceived
power, which in turn can influence willingness to adopt self-
protective actions (e.g., wearing sunscreen).
Our findings also imply a rich avenue for future research.
First, what if the anthropomorphized entity is not a risk
generator but a risk preventer? For example, instead of a
disease, a vaccine could be anthropomorphized. In that case,
will we think of the anthropomorphized vaccine as more
effective and trustworthy or less? Going further, what if the
anthropomorphized entity does not bear risk at all? We sus-
pect that power may still play a role to the extent that people
want to control the products (e.g., managing complex au-
diovisual equipment). Another avenue for future research
might be to explore different types of social power or the
interaction of power and communal and exchange relation-
ship norms (Aggarwal 2004; Clark and Mills 1993) or social
value orientation (Smeesters et al. 2003). For example, re-
gardless of social power, consumers who see their relation-
ship as more communal or who adopt a prosocial orientation
may not see a smiling face as something to be exploited,
whereas high-power consumers in an exchange relationship
or who adopt a pro-self-orientation may try to take advan-
tage of such a “good-natured” entity, acting more defer-
entially to one with a serious or even fierce expression. Also,
future research could explore differences in the application
of power, depending on specific characteristics of the an-
thropomorphized entity. For example, power perceptions
may alter expectations and behavior toward objects anthro-
pomorphized as male or female or as young or old. In sum,
researchers may find consumers’ responses to anthropo-
morphized entities, providing these entities are seen as hav-
ing a humanlike mind, to be highly sensitive and as complex
as those involving people.
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